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Abstract
Resorting to the Dichotomous decision model, where individuals can make alternative decisions, we study two
geometric approaches to construct all possible decisions tiling. Each decision tiling indicates the way the Nash
equilibria co-exist and change with the relative decision preferences of the individuals. We find the Nash domains for
the pure and mixed strategies and characterize the space of all parameters where the pure Nash equilibria are either
cohesive or disparate. We show how the coordinates of the influence matrix together with the total number of
individuals affect significantly the occurrence of bifurcations with and without overlaps between the pure strategies.
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Introduction
The Dichotomous decision model is a recent game theoretical model introduced by Mousa et al.
in 2014 (Mousa et al., 2014a). In this model, there are just two possible decisions that individuals
can make. For instance, they have to choose between yes or no, i.e. d ∈ D = {Yes, No}. The
individuals will have to make decisions according to their preferences. The preferences have the
interesting feature of taking into account not only how much the individuals like or dislike a certain
decision but also the other individuals’ decisions. This decision model has wide applications in real
life and can be used to understand better the social interaction (Mousa et al., 2011a; Mousa et al.,
2015a), tourism industry (Brida et al., 2010; Brida et al., 2011) and economical and political
revolutions (Almeida et al., 2011a; Almeida et al., 2011b; Mousa et al., 2011b; Mousa et al.,
2014b).
The Dichotomous decision model is a modified version of the game theoretical model introduced
by Pinto et al. (Almeida et al., 2011a) who developed a psychological game model for reasoned
action theories inspired by the works of J. Cownley and M. Wooders (Conley and Wooders, 2001).
They studied the way saturation, boredom and frustration can lead to desperate strategies (if the
individuals of same group will make different decisions), and no saturation situations can lead to
cohesive strategies (if all the individuals belonging to a same group will make the same decision).
Ajzen (Ajzen, 2002) and Baker et al. (Baker et al., 2008) predict the way individuals turn intentions
into behaviors and this prediction is the main goal in Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action
theories.
Mousa et al. (Mousa et al., 2015a) show that groups are formed by individuals with the same
utility, and a group is cohesive if every individual has a gain in his utility when other individuals
of the same group make the same decision as his. Furthermore, they show that individuals in a
same group can make different decisions at certain Nash equilibria. In a dynamical version of the
decision model (Mousa et al., 2014a), the authors exhibit solutions that are periodic attracting
cycles and so the individuals can keep changing the probabilities that they use to make a decision
or another around some thresholds. These thresholds show the appearance of hysteretic-like
behavior in the decision models. As in dynamics (Mousa, 2013), small changes in the parameters
might imply the appearance and disappearance of the pure Nash equilibria.
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The Dichotomous decision model has been extended to a general model (Mousa, 2013), and
other future extension formulation for the decision model would be to include some kind of
stochastic pattern in the model parameters. Recent research articles, that handle a stochastic
decision problem for individuals, is introduced by Mousa et al. (Mousa et al., 2015b; Mousa et al.,
2016).
In this paper, we study two geometric approaches to construct all possible Nash eqilibria for the
decisions tiling. We characterize the space of all parameters for the Dichotomous decision model,
where the pure and mixed strategies are Nash equilibria, and we find the corresponding Nash
domains. We will see how the coordinates of the influence matrix together with the total number
of individuals encode all the relevant information for the existence of Nash equilibria strategies.
The existence of these equilibria is also related to size effect of the relative decision preferences
for the individuals. The two approaches rise in making 289 different combinatorial classes of
decision tiling by capturing the information that rises from the crowding type of individuals,
reflecting the complexity of the yes-no decision model (Mousa et al., 2011a).
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review the Dichotomous decision model and
some main results introduced in (Mousa et al., 2014a), in Section 3, we study two different strategic
approaches to construct geometrically all possible tilings and determine the Nash domains for the
pure and mixed strategies and we conclude in Section 5

The Dichotomous decision model
In this section, we review the Dichotomous decision model introduced in (Mousa et al., 2014a)
with some main results. In section 2.1 we introduce the decision model. In section 2.2 we study the
pure Nash equilibria and in section 2.3 we study the mixed Nash equilibria.
2.1. Model set up. The model has two types 𝑻 = {𝑡1 , 𝑡2 } of individuals. Let 𝐼1 = {1, ⋯ , 𝑛1 } be
the set of all individuals with type 𝑡1 , and let 𝐼2 = {1, ⋯ , 𝑛2 } be the set of all individuals with
type 𝑡2 . Let 𝑰 = 𝐼1 ∐ 𝐼2 be the disjoint union. The individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑰 has to make one decision 𝑑 ∈
𝑫 = {𝑌, 𝑁}1.

1

Similarly, we can consider that there is a single individual with type 𝑡𝑝 that has to make 𝑛𝑝 decisions, or we can
also consider a mixed model using these two possibilities.
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Let L be the preference decision matrix whose coordinates 𝑤𝑝𝑑 indicate how much an individual
with type 𝑡𝑝 likes or dislikes, making decision 𝑑 ∈ 𝑫
𝐿=(

𝑤1𝑌
𝑤2𝑌

𝑤1𝑁
).
𝑤2𝑁

The coordinates of the preference decision matrix indicate for each type of individuals the decision
that the individuals prefer, i.e. the taste type of the individuals (Mousa et al., 2011a; Mousa et al.,
2014a; Mousa et al., 2015a). Let 𝑁𝑑 be the preference neighbors matrix whose coordinates
𝑑
𝛼𝑝𝑞
indicate how much an individual with type 𝑡𝑝 who decides d likes or dislikes that an individual

with type 𝑡𝑞 also makes decision 𝑑
𝛼𝑑
𝑁𝑑 = ( 11
𝑑
𝛼21

𝑑
𝛼12
𝑑 ).
𝛼22

The coordinates of the preference neighbors matrix indicate, for each type of individuals whose
decision is d, whom they prefer, or do not prefer, to be with in each decision, i.e. the crowding type
of the individuals (Brida et al., 2010; Conley and Wooders, 2001; Mousa et al., 2014a).
Definition 2.1 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The (pure) decision of the individuals is a (pure) strategy
map 𝑆: 𝑰 → 𝑫 that associates to each individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑰 its decision 𝑆(𝑖) ∈ 𝑫.
Let 𝑺 be the space of all strategies 𝑆. For a given a strategy 𝑆 ∈ 𝑺, let 𝑂𝑆 be the strategic decision
matrix whose coordinates 𝐿𝑑𝑝 = 𝐿𝑑𝑝 (S) indicate the number of individuals with type 𝑡𝑝 , who make
decision 𝑑
𝐿𝑌
𝑂𝑠 = ( 𝑌1
𝐿2

𝐿𝑁1
).
𝐿𝑁2

Definition 2.2 (Mousa et al., 2014a). Let 𝑆 ∈ 𝑺. The strategic decision vector associated to a
strategy 𝑆 is the vector
(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = (𝑙1𝑌 (𝑆), 𝑙2𝑌 (𝑆)) ,
where 𝑙1 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 𝑛1 − 𝑙1 ) is the number of individuals with type 𝑡1 who make the decision
𝑌 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 𝑁), and 𝑙2 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 𝑛2 − 𝑙2 ) is the number of individuals with type 𝑡2 who make the
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decision 𝑌 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 𝑁). Furthermore, the set 𝑶 of all possible strategic decision vectors is defined
by
𝑶 = {0, ⋯ , 𝑛1 } × {0, ⋯ , 𝑛2 } .
The utility function 𝑈1 : 𝑫 × 𝑶 → ℝ of an individual with type 𝑡1 is defined by
𝑌 (𝑙
𝑌
𝑈1 (𝑌; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝜔1𝑌 + 𝛼11
1 − 1) + 𝛼12 𝑙2 ;
𝑁 (𝑛
𝑁
𝑈1 (𝑁; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝜔1𝑁 + 𝛼11
1 − 𝑙1 − 1) + 𝛼12 (𝑛2 − 𝑙2 )

and the utility function 𝑈2 : 𝑫 × 𝑶 → ℝ of an individual with type 𝑡2 is defined by
𝑌 (𝑙
𝑌
𝑈2 (𝑌; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝜔2𝑌 + 𝛼22
2 − 1) + 𝛼21 𝑙1 ;
𝑁 (𝑛
𝑁
𝑈2 (𝑁; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝜔2𝑁 + 𝛼22
2 − 𝑙2 − 1) + 𝛼21 (𝑛1 − 𝑙1 ) .

Given a strategy 𝑆 ∈ 𝑺, the utility 𝑈𝑖 (𝑆) of an individual 𝑖 with type 𝑡𝑝(i) is given
by 𝑈𝑝(𝑖) (S(i); 𝑙1𝑌 (𝑆), 𝑙2𝑌 (𝑆)).

Definition 2.3 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The horizontal relative decision preference of the individuals
with type 𝑡1 is defined by
x = ω1𝑌 − ω1𝑁
and the vertical relative decision preference of the individuals with type 𝑡2 is defined by
y = ω𝑌2 − ω𝑁
2 .
If 𝑥 > 0, the individuals with type 𝑡1 prefer to decide 𝑌 , without taking into account the
influence of the others. If 𝑥 = 0, the individuals with type 𝑡1 are indifferent to decide 𝑌 or 𝑁,
without taking into account the influence of the others. If 𝑥 < 0, the individuals with type 𝑡1 prefer
to decide 𝑁, without taking into account the influence of the others.
Definition 2.4 (Mousa et al., 2014a). For 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, we define the coordinates of the influence
matrix 𝐴 by
𝑌
𝑁
𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
.
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If 𝐴𝑖𝑗 > 0, the individuals with type 𝑡𝑗 have a positive influence over the utility of the
individuals with type 𝑡𝑖 . If 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 0, the individuals with type 𝑡𝑗 are indifferent for the utility of
the individuals with type 𝑡𝑖 . If 𝐴𝑖𝑗 < 0, the individuals with type𝑡𝑗 have a negative influence over
the utility of the individuals with type 𝑡𝑖 .
Definition 2.5 (Mousa et al., 2014a). A strategy 𝑆 ∗ : 𝑰 → 𝑫 is a Nash equilibrium if, for every
individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑰 and for every strategy 𝑆, with the property that 𝑆 ∗ (𝑗) = 𝑆(𝑗) for every
individual 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼 \ {𝑖}, we have 𝑈𝑖 (𝑆 ∗ ) ≥ 𝑈𝑖 (𝑆). Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium domain 𝐸(𝑆)
of a strategy 𝑆 is the set of all pairs (𝑥, 𝑦) for which 𝑆 is a Nash Equilibrium.

2.2. Pure Nash equilibria. The pure strategies are either cohesive strategies or disparate strategies.

Definition 2.6 (Mousa et al., 2014a). A cohesive strategy is a pure strategy in which all individuals
with the same type prefer to make the same decision. A disparate strategy is a pure strategy that is
not cohesive, i.e. a pure strategy in which there are some individuals with the same type who prefer
to make different decisions.
Lemma 2.7 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The Nash domain 𝑵(𝑌, 𝑌) of the cohesive strategy (𝑌, 𝑌) is
given by
𝑵(𝑌, 𝑌) = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥 ≥ 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 ≥ 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑌)} ,
where the horizontal 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌) and vertical 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑌) strategic thresholds of the (𝑌, 𝑌) strategy are
given by
𝑌 (𝑛
𝑌
𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌) = − 𝛼11
1 − 1) − 𝛼12 𝑛2 and

𝑌
𝑌
𝑉(𝑌, 𝑌) = − 𝛼22
(𝑛2 − 1) − 𝛼21
𝑛1 .

Hence, the cohesive strategy (𝑌, 𝑌) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑵(𝑌, 𝑌).
Moreover, the Nash domain 𝑵(𝑌, 𝑌) is the right-upper quadrant in the xy-plane (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Cohesive Nash equilibria domain 𝑵(𝒀, 𝒀), (Mousa et al., 2014a).

Lemma 2.8 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The Nash domain 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑁) of the cohesive strategy (𝑌, 𝑁) is
given by
𝑵(𝑌, 𝑁) = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥 ≥ 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑁) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 ≤ 𝑉 (𝑌, 𝑁)} ,
where the horizontal 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑁) and vertical 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑁) strategic thresholds of the (𝑌, 𝑁) strategy are
given by
𝑌
𝑁
𝐻(𝑌, 𝑁) = − 𝛼11
(𝑛1 − 1) + 𝛼12
𝑛2

and

𝑁
𝑌
𝑉(𝑌, 𝑁) = 𝛼22
(𝑛2 − 1) − 𝛼21
𝑛1 .

Figure 2: Cohesive Nash equilibria domain 𝑵(𝒀, 𝑵), (Mousa et al., 2014a).

Hence, the cohesive strategy (𝑌, 𝑁) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑁).
Moreover, the Nash domain 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑁) is a right-lower quadrant in the xy-plane (see Figure 2).
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Lemma 2.9 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The Nash domain 𝑵(𝑁, 𝑌) of the cohesive strategy (𝑁, 𝑌) is
given by
𝑵(𝑁, 𝑌) = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥 ≤ 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑌) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 ≥ 𝑉 (𝑁, 𝑌)} ,
where the horizontal 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑌) and vertical 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑌) strategic thresholds of the (𝑁, 𝑌) strategy are
𝑁 (𝑛
𝑌
𝐻(𝑁, 𝑌) = 𝛼11
1 − 1) − 𝛼12 𝑛2

and

𝑌 (𝑛
𝑁
𝑉(𝑁, 𝑌) = −𝛼22
2 − 1) − 𝛼21 𝑛1 .

Figure 3. Cohesive Nash equilibria domain 𝑵(𝑵, 𝒀), (Mousa et al., 2014a).

Hence, the cohesive strategy (𝑁, 𝑌) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑵(𝑁, 𝑌).
Moreover, the Nash domain 𝑵(𝑁, 𝑌) is a left-upper quadrant in the 𝑥𝑦-plane (see Figure 3).

Figure 4. Cohesive Nash equilibria domain 𝑵(𝑵, 𝑵), (Mousa et al., 2014a).
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Lemma 2.10 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The Nash domain 𝑵(𝑁, 𝑁) of the cohesive strategy (𝑁, 𝑁) is
given by
𝑵(𝑁, 𝑁) = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥 ≤ 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 ≤ 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁)} ,
where the horizontal 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁) and vertical 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁) strategic thresholds of the (𝑁, 𝑁) strategy are
𝑁 (𝑛
𝑁
𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁) = 𝛼11
1 − 1) + 𝛼12 𝑛2

and

𝑁 (𝑛
𝑁
𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁) = 𝛼22
2 − 1) + 𝛼21 𝑛1 .

Hence, the cohesive strategy (𝑁, 𝑁) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑵(𝑁, 𝑁).
Moreover, the Nash domain 𝑵(𝑁, 𝑁) is a left-lower quadrant in the xy-plane (see Figure 4).
2.3. Mixed Nash equilibria. Recall the disjoint union set 𝐈 = I1 ⊔ I2 . We describe the (mixed)
decision of the individuals by a (mixed) strategy map 𝑆: 𝑰 → [0, 1] that associates to each
individual i ∈ 𝐈𝟏 the probability 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑆(𝑖) to decide 𝑌 ∈ 𝑫 and to each individual j ∈ 𝐈𝟐 the
probability 𝑞𝑗 = 𝑆(𝑗) to decide 𝑌 ∈ 𝑫. Hence, each individual i ∈ 𝐈𝟏 decides 𝑁 ∈ 𝑫 with
probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 = 1 − 𝑆(𝑖) and each individual j ∈ 𝐈𝟐 decides 𝑁 ∈ 𝑫 with probability
1 − 𝑞𝑗 = 1 − 𝑆(𝑗). We assume that the decisions of the individuals are independent.
𝑛1
𝑛2
Define 𝑃 = ∑𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖 , Q = ∑𝑗=1
𝑞𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃 − 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑄𝑗 = 𝑄 − 𝑞𝑗 . For every individual i ∈ 𝐈𝟏 ,

the 𝑌-fitness function 𝑓𝑌,1 : [0, 1] × [0, 𝑛1 ] × [0, 𝑛2 ] → ℝ + is given by
𝑌
𝑌
𝑓𝑌,1 (𝑝𝑖 ; P, Q) = ω1𝑌 + α11
𝑃𝑖 + α12
Q;

and the 𝑁-fitness function𝑓𝑁,1 ∶ [0, 1] × [0, 𝑛1 ] × [0, 𝑛2 ] → ℝ+ is given by
𝑁
𝑁
𝑓𝑁,1 (𝑝𝑖 ; P, Q) = ω1𝑁 + α11
(𝑛1 −1 − 𝑃𝑖 ) + α12
(𝑛2 − Q) .

For every individual 𝑗 ∈ 𝑰𝟐 , the 𝑌-fitness function 𝑓𝑌,2 : [0, 1] × [0, 𝑛1 ] × [0, 𝑛2 ] → ℝ + is given
by
𝑓𝑌,2 (𝑞𝑗 ; P, Q) = ω𝑌2 + α𝑌22 Q𝑗 + α𝑌21 P ;
and the 𝑁-fitness function 𝑓𝑁,2 ∶ [0, 1] × [0, 𝑛1 ] × [0, 𝑛2 ] → ℝ+ is given by
𝑁
𝑁
𝑓𝑁,2(𝑞𝑗 ; P, Q) = ω𝑁
2 + α22 (𝑛2 − 1 −Q 𝑗 ) + α21 (𝑛1 − P) .

Lemma 2.11 (Mousa et al., 2014a). Let 𝑆 ∶ 𝑰 → [0, 1] be a mixed strategy. For every individual
𝑖 ∈ 𝑰𝟏 , the utility function 𝑈1 ∶ [0, 1] × [0, 𝑛1 ] × [0, 𝑛2 ] → ℝ+ is given by
𝑈1 (𝑝𝑖 ; 𝑃, 𝑄) = 𝑝𝑖 𝑓𝑌,1 (𝑝𝑖 ; 𝑃, 𝑄) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖 ) 𝑓𝑁,1 (𝑝𝑖 ; 𝑃, 𝑄) .
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For every individual 𝑗 ∈ 𝑰𝟐 , the utility function 𝑈2 ∶ [0, 1] × [0, 𝑛1 ] × [0, 𝑛2 ] → ℝ+ is given
by
𝑈2 (𝑞𝑗 ; 𝑝, 𝑄) = 𝑞𝑗 𝑓𝑌,2 (𝑞𝑗 ; 𝑃, 𝑄) + (1 − 𝑞𝑗 ) 𝑓𝑁,2 (𝑞𝑗 ; 𝑃, 𝑄) .
Definition 2.12 (Mousa et al., 2014a). A strategy 𝑆 ∗ : 𝑰 → [0, 1] is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium, if
𝑈𝑖 (𝑆 ∗ ) ≥ 𝑈𝑖 (𝑆) for every individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑰 and for every strategy 𝑆 ∈ 𝑺 with the property that
𝑆 ∗ (𝑗) = 𝑆(𝑗), for every individual 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼 \ {𝑖}.
Lemma 2.13 (Mousa et al., 2014a). Let 𝑆: 𝑰 → [0, 1] be a mixed Nash equilibrium.
(i)

If 0 < 𝑝𝑖 < 1, then 𝑥 = −𝐴11 (𝑃 − 𝑝𝑖 ) − 𝐴12 𝑄 + 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁) .

(ii) If 0 < 𝑞𝑗 < 1, then = − 𝐴22 (𝑄 − 𝑞𝑗 ) − 𝐴21 𝑃 + 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁) .
Hence, if A11 ≠ 0, then there is not a mixed Nash equilibrium with the property that 0 < 𝑝𝑖1 ≠
𝑝𝑖2 < 1. Furthermore, if 𝐴22 ≠ 0, then there is not a mixed Nash equilibrium with the property
that 0 < 𝑞𝑗1 ≠ 𝑞𝑗2 < 1.
Definition 2.14 (Mousa et al., 2014a). The (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) mixed strategic set is the set of all
strategies 𝑆 ∶ 𝑰 → [0, 1] with the following properties:
(i) 𝑙1 = #{𝑖 ∈ 𝐼1 ∶ 𝑝𝑖 = 1} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘1 = #{𝑖 ∈ 𝐼1 ∶ 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝};
(ii) 𝑙2 = #{𝑗 ∈ 𝐼2 ∶ 𝑞𝑗 = 1} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘2 = #{𝑗 ∈ 𝐼2 ∶ 𝑞𝑗 = 𝑞};
(iii) 𝑛1 − (𝑙1 + 𝑘1 ) = #{𝑖 ∈ 𝐼1 ∶ 𝑝𝑖 = 0} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛2 − (𝑙2 + 𝑘2 ) = #{𝑗 ∈ 𝐼2 ∶ 𝑞𝑗 = 0}.
For 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ {0, 1}, we observe that the (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) mixed strategic set is equal to the
(𝑙1 + 𝑝𝑘1 , 𝑙2 + 𝑞𝑘2 ) pure strategic set.
Remark 2.15 (Mousa et al., 2014a). By Lemma 2.13, supposing that 𝐴11 ≠ 0 and 𝐴22 ≠ 0, a
mixed strategy 𝑆 is a Nash equilibrium, if 𝑆 is contained in some (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) mixed
strategic set.
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Since individuals with the same type are identical, if a mixed strategy contained in the
(𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) mixed strategic set is a Nash equilibrium, then all the strategies in
the (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) mixed strategic set are Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.16 (Mousa et al., 2014a). An (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) mixed Nash equilibrium (set) is an
(𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) strategic set whose strategies are Nash equilibria. The (mixed) Nash domain
𝑵(𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) is the set of all pairs (𝑥, 𝑦) for which the (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) strategic set is
a mixed Nash equilibrium set.
An (𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) strict mixed Nash equilibrium set is a mixed Nash equilibrium set that
does not contain pure strategies, i.e. (𝑝, 𝑞) ∈ [0,1]2 \ {0,1}2 . A strict mixed Nash domain
𝑵(𝑙1 , 𝑘1 , 𝑝; 𝑙2 , 𝑘2 , 𝑞) is the mixed Nash domain of a strict mixed Nash equilibrium set.

Geometric approaches in constructing Tilings
In this section, we study two strategic approaches to construct Nash domains. The two
approaches are the global approach and the local approach. In the global approach, we will
construct all possible tilings using the coordinates of the influence matrix. In the local approach,
we will characterize all possible orders for the domains of the pure and mixed Nash equilibria in
tilings using the coordinates of the influence matrix too. We should remark that all Figures
displayed in Section 3 and Section 4 are all original and created by the authors themselves. In order
to proceed, we need to introduce some auxiliary and generalized results.
Theorem 3.1. The (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) strategy is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ), where
𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 )},
the left horizontal threshold 𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) and the right horizontal threshold 𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) of the (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 )
strategy are given by
𝑁
𝑁
𝑌
𝑌
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝛼11
𝑛1 + 𝛼12
𝑛2 + 𝛼11
− (𝛼12
+ 𝛼12
)𝑙2 − (𝛼11
+ 𝛼11
)𝑙1
𝑁
𝑁
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝛼11
𝑛1 + 𝛼12
𝑛2 − 𝛼11
− (𝛼12
+ 𝛼12
)𝑙2 − (𝛼11
+ 𝛼11
) 𝑙1 ,

the down vertical threshold 𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) and the the upper vertical threshold 𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) of the
(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) strategy are given by
𝑁
𝑁
𝑌
𝑌
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝛼22
𝑛2 + 𝛼21
𝑛1 + 𝛼22
− (𝛼21
+ 𝛼21
)𝑙2 − (𝛼22
+ 𝛼22
)𝑙2
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𝑁
𝑁
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝛼22
𝑛2 + 𝛼21
𝑛1 − 𝛼22
− (𝛼21
+ 𝛼21
)𝑙1 − (𝛼22
+ 𝛼22
) 𝑙2 .

Proof. The (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) strategy is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, the following four inequalities
hold
U1 (Y; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ≥ U1 (N; 𝑙1 − 1, 𝑙2 ) ,

U1 (N; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ≥ U1 (Y ; 𝑙1 + 1, 𝑙2 )

U2 (Y ; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ≥ U2 (N; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 − 1) ,

U2 (N; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ≥ U2 (Y ; 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 + 1) .

and

Hence, the proof of Theorem 3.1 follows by rearranging the terms in the previous inequalities.
■
Hence, 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) is the Nash Equilibrium domain of the (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) strategy (see Figure 5). Each
geometric graph in Figure 5 is called a tiling results by joining the four quadrants described in
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 in one geometric graph. The horizontal preferences 𝑥 for individuals of type
𝑡1 is being the 𝑥-axis and the vertical preferences 𝑦 for individuals of type 𝑡2 is being the y-axis.
Each tiling indicates the way the horizontal thresholds 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌), 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑌), 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁) are
ordered along the horizontal 𝑥-axis and the way the vertical thresholds 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑌), 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑌),
𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁) are ordered along the vertical 𝑦-axis. The order of these horizontal thresholds and vertical
thresholds gives rise to the Nash equilibria location, and thus determines the Nash domain for each
strategy. More details about the construction of these tilings will be discussed in the coming
section.
The following thresholds determine the domains of the (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) disparate Nash equilibria.
𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 + 1, 𝑙2 ),

𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 + 1) + 𝐴12 ,

𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 + 1),

𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 + 1) + 𝐴12 ,

𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) − 𝐴22 ,

𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑉𝐷 (𝑙1 + 1, 𝑙2 ) + 𝐴21 ,

𝐻𝑅 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝐻𝐿 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) − 𝐴11 ,

𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑉𝑈 (𝑙1 + 1, 𝑙2 ) + 𝐴21 .

We observe that (see Figure 5) if 𝐴11 > 0 or 𝐴22 > 0, then there are no (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) Nash Equilibria,
for every 𝑙1 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛1 − 1} and 𝑙2 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛2 − 1}. However, if 𝐴11 ≤ 0 and 𝐴22 ≤ 0, then
there are (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) Nash Equilibria, for every 𝑙1 ∈ {1, ⋯ , 𝑛1 − 1} and 𝑙2 ∈ {1, ⋯ , 𝑛2 − 1}.
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Figure 5. Disparate Nash equilibria when 𝒏𝟏 = 𝟒 and 𝒏𝟐 = 𝟑. Left: 𝑨𝟏𝟏 < 𝟎, 𝑨𝟏𝟐 < 𝟎, 𝑨𝟐𝟏 < 𝟎 and
𝑨𝟐𝟐 < 𝟎. The yellow rectangles include two pure Nash equilibria and a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Right: 𝑨𝟏𝟏 < 𝟎, 𝑨𝟏𝟐 > 𝟎, 𝑨𝟐𝟏 < 𝟎 and 𝑨𝟐𝟐 < 𝟎. The yellow rectangles have no pure Nash equilibrium
but include a mixed Nash equilibrium.

Lemma 3.2. The Nash domains satisfy the following properties: 𝑁(𝑛1 , 𝑛2 ) = 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑌),
𝑁(𝑛1 , 0) = 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝑁(0, 𝑛2 ) = 𝑁(𝑁, 𝑌), 𝑁(0,0) = 𝑁(𝑁, 𝑁).
Proof. We prove 𝑁(𝑛1 , 𝑛2 ) = 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑌) and the proof for the other Nash domains follows similarly.
Substituting 𝑙1 by 𝑛1 and 𝑙2 by 𝑛2 in the horizontal and vertical thresholds stated in Theorem 3.1,
we have that
𝑁
𝑁
𝑌
𝑌
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝐻𝐿 (𝑛1 , 𝑛2 ) = 𝛼 11
𝑛1 + 𝛼 12
𝑛2 + 𝛼11
− (𝛼12
+ 𝛼12
)𝑛2 − (𝛼11
+ 𝛼11
)𝑛1
𝑌
𝑌
= − 𝛼 11
(𝑛1 − 1) − 𝛼 12
𝑛2

= 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌)
and
𝑁
𝑌
𝑌
𝑁
𝑌
𝑁
𝑉𝐷 (𝑛1 , 𝑛2 ) = 𝛼 𝑁
22 𝑛2 + 𝛼 21 𝑛1 + 𝛼 22 − (𝛼21 + 𝛼 21 ) 𝑛1 − (𝛼22 + 𝛼 22 ) 𝑛1

= − 𝛼 𝑌22 (𝑛2 − 1) − 𝛼 𝑌21 𝑛1
= 𝑉 (𝑌, 𝑌) .
Hence, 𝑁(𝑛1 , 𝑛2 ) = 𝑁(𝑌, 𝑌) and we conclude the proof.
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3.1. Global approach. We will see that the coordinates of the influence matrix together with the
total number of individuals play a significant role to determine the Nash domains for a given
strategy. We will also denote to the Nash domains 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) by 𝑄(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) as being referred to the
quadrants.

We

notify

that

a

pair

of

thresholds

(𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌), 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑌))

(respectively, (𝐻(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑁)), (𝐻(𝑁, 𝑌), 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑌)), (𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁), 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁))) form a corner for
the quadrant 𝑄(𝑌, 𝑌)(respectively, 𝑄(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝑄(𝑁, 𝑌), 𝑄(𝑁, 𝑁)). We summarize the global
approach by the following remark which provides a strategy for constructing all possible tilings:
Remark 3.3 (Golden Tiling). Let 𝑆1 = (𝐴12 , 𝐴22 ) and 𝑆2 = (𝐴11 , 𝐴21 ). Every tiling is
determined by a corner of quadrant and a vector of stairs (𝑆1, 𝑆2 ) together with the total number of
individuals.

We now emphasize Remark 3.3 by referring to the Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 and by ordering the
following steps:


Connect the losangles between the corner of the quadrants 𝑄(𝑌, 𝑌), 𝑄(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝑄(𝑁, 𝑌) and
𝑄(𝑁, 𝑁);



Use the coordinates of the influence matrix (𝐴22 , 𝐴12 ) to construct the left and right green
ladders boundaries of the losangles (see Figures 7 and 8);



Use the coordinates of the influence matrix (𝐴11 , 𝐴21 ) to construct the upper and down blue
ladders boundaries of the losangles (see Figures 6 and 9);



We repeat the second and third items in a similar fashion, but with different locations;



The ladders intersect the losangles in the points upper-down
𝒋𝟐 𝑨𝟏𝟐
𝒏𝟐



The ladders intersect the losangles in the points left-right
𝒋𝟏 𝑨𝟐𝟏
𝒏𝟏

23|
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Figure 5. Left: Left green boundaries shift 1: The rule: Go in the boundaries in the horizontal
dimension of the right corner and come in from outside of the horizontal boundaries in the horizontal
dimension of the left corner. Right: Left green boundaries shift 2: The rule: Go out from the
boundaries in the horizontal dimension of the left corner and come in from inside the horizontal
boundaries in the horizontal dimension of the right corner.

We remark that shifts in the left green ladders boundaries of the losangles are different from right
green ladders boundaries of the losangles; shifts in the upper blue ladders boundaries of the
losangles are different from down blue ladders boundaries of the losangles; and down blue stars
start in blue stars and they end in the green circles, but upper blue stars start in the green circles
and end in the blue stars.

24|
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Figure 6. Left: Right green boundaries shift 1: The rule: Go in the boundaries in the horizontal
dimension of the left corner and come in from outside of the horizontal boundaries in the horizontal
dimension of the right corner. Right: Right green boundaries shift 2: The rule: Go out from the
boundaries in the horizontal dimension of the right corner and come in from inside the horizontal
boundaries in the horizontal dimension of the left corner.

We see that there are eight different boundaries kind of shifts: left green boundaries shift 1, left
green boundaries shift 2, right green boundaries shift 1, right green boundaries shift 2, down blue
boundaries shift 1, down blue boundaries shift 2, upper blue boundaries shift 1 and upper blue
boundaries shift 2.

Figure 7. Left: Down blue boundaries shift 1: The rule: Go out of the boundaries in the vertical
dimension of the upper corner and come in from inside the vertical boundaries in the vertical
25|
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dimension of the lower corner. Right: Down blue boundaries shift 2: The rule: Go in the boundaries
in the vertical dimension of the lower corner and come in from outside the vertical boundaries in the
vertical dimension of the upper corner.

Figure 8. Left: Upper blue boundaries shift 1: The rule: Go in of the boundaries in the vertical
dimension of the upper corner and come in from outside the vertical boundaries in the vertical
dimension of the lower corner. Right: Upper blue boundaries shift 2: The rule: Go out the boundaries
in the vertical dimension of the lower corner and come in from inside the vertical boundaries in the
vertical dimension of the upper corner.

Recall that 𝑶 is the set of all possible strategic occupation vectors. Let the horizontal and vertical
set of strategies be given, respectively, by
𝑶𝐻 = {(0, 𝑙2 )} ∪ {(𝑛1 , 𝑙2 )}

and

𝑂𝑉 = {(𝑙1 , 0)} ∪ {(𝑙1 , 𝑛2 )}

for every 𝑙1 ∈ {0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛1 } and 𝑙2 ∈ {0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛2 } .
The following theorem determines the conditions that guarantee the existence of a strictly mixed
Nash equilibrium for a given tiling.
Theorem 3.4. Given an influence matrix 𝐴 and a point of stairs 𝑆 = (𝑆1 , 𝑆2 ). The corresponding
tiling 𝑇(𝐴, 𝑆) has the following properties:

26|
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if 𝐴12 𝐴21 > 0, then there is a strictly mixed strategies only in the Nash equilibria

(i)

domain 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) for every pure strategy (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ∈ 𝑶\{𝑶𝐻 ∪ 𝑶𝑉 };
(ii)

if 𝐴12 𝐴21 < 0, then there is a strictly mixed strategies only outside the Nash equilibria
domain 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) for every pure strategy (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ∈ 𝑶\{𝑶𝐻 ∪ 𝑶𝑉 };

(iii)

if 𝐴12 𝐴21 = 0, then there are no strictly mixed strategies for every pure strategy
(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ∈ 𝑶.

Proof. By Contradiction. We proof case (i) and the proof of cases (ii)−(iii) follows similarly.
Assume that there is a strictly mixed Nash equilibrium strategy
𝑆 ∶ 𝐼 → [0, 1]
in the Nash equilibria domain 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) for some occupation vector (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) ∈ {𝑶𝐻 ∪ 𝑶𝑉 }.
Note that 𝐴12 𝐴21 > 0 implies that either 𝐴12 > 0 and 𝐴21 > 0 (individuals of a certain type
affect positively the other type of individuals to chair a particular decision) or 𝐴12 < 0 and
𝐴 21 < 0 (individuals of a certain type affect negatively the other type of individuals to chair
a particular decision). If 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑁(0, 0), then 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑞𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑖 = 0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛1 and
𝑗 = 0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛2 which contradicts the fact that 𝑆 ∶ 𝐼 → [0, 1] is a strictly mixed Nash
equilibrium strategy. Similarly, if 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑁(𝑛1 , 𝑛2 ), then 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑞𝑗 = 1 for all 𝑖 =
0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛1 and 𝑗 = 0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛2 which contradicts the fact that 𝑆 ∶ 𝑰 → [0, 1] is a strictly
mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. If 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑁(0, 𝑙2 ) (resp. 𝑁(𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ) = 𝑁(𝑙1 , 0)), then
𝑝𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 = 0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛1 (resp. 𝑞𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑗 = 0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑛2 ) which gives a
■

contradiction too.

In Figure 10, we show an example of two rotated tilings in which the horizontal thresholds
𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌), 𝐻(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑌), 𝐻(𝑁, 𝑁) are ordered along the horizontal x-axis and the vertical
thresholds 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑌), 𝑉(𝑌, 𝑁), 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑌), 𝑉(𝑁, 𝑁) are ordered along the vertical y-axis. The
influence matrix for the left tiling and the influence matrix for the right tiling are, respectively,
given by
−2 3
A=(
)
−3 −2
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Figure 9. Pure and mixed Nash equilibria.

Hence, small changes in the coordinates of the influence matrix can create a different tiling. In
(Mousa et al., 2011a), it was shown that there are 289 combinatorial classes of decision tilings,
described by the decision Bussola, which demonstrate the high complexity of making decision.

3.2. Local Approach. The local approach uses the signs of the coordinates of the influence
matrix to determine the domains of the pure and mixed strategies in all tilings (see Figure 11).
We observe that changing the signs of the pairs (𝐴11 , 𝐴21 ) and (𝐴12 , 𝐴22 ) imply different orders
for the pure strategies (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ). For all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, let
𝑬𝒊𝒋 = −𝑨𝒊𝒋 .
Let us define the horizontal axis by 𝐸12 and the vertical axis by 𝐸21 . The sign of the pair
(𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) determines a certain order of pure strategies (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 ). Note that there are four possible
orders for the pure strategies that are not located along any axis which are given by small white
rectangles in Figure 11.
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Figure 10. Rotating pure Nash domains using the local approach.

We study the rotation in the pure Nash domains. Given the location of the pure strategies in
the small white rectangles, We observe the following: If the signs of the coordinates
(𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) is (+, +), then the pure strategies are rotated to make new ordering given by the
small red rectangles that appear in Figure 12.

Figure 11. Rotating the pure strategies when the signs of (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) 𝐢𝐬 (+, +).
The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small red rectangles.
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If the signs of the coordinates (𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) is (+, −), then the pure strategies are rotated to make
new ordering given by the small orange rectangles appear in Figure 13.

Figure 12: Rotating the pure strategies when the signs of (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) 𝐢𝐬 (+, −).
The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small orange rectangles.

If the signs of the coordinates (𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) is (−, +), then the pure strategies are rotated to make
new ordering given by the small green rectangles appear in Figure 14.

Figure 13. Rotating the pure strategies when the signs of (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) 𝒊𝒔 (−, +).
The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small green rectangles.
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If the signs of the coordinates (𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) is (−, −), then the rotated to make new ordering given
by pure strategies are the small blue rectangles appear in Figure 15.

Figure 14. Rotating the pure strategies when the signs of (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) 𝐢𝐬 (−, −).
The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small blue rectangles.

Mixed strategies in local approach
We study geometrically two cases where mixed strategies co-exist. We present the first case
in section 4.1, where no intersection between the pure strategies occurs; the second case will
be introduced in section 4.2, where an intersection between the pure strategies occurs.

No intersections between pure the strategies
Without loss of generality, we will consider the case where the signs of (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) is (+, +) and
focus on the mixed strategies that occurs in the corresponding Figure 12. The other three cases
follow in a similar way. Recall that 𝑝 ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of an individual of type 𝑡1
makes decision 𝑌 and 𝑞 ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of an individual of type 𝑡2 makes decision
𝑌.

31|

Journal of the Arab American University. Volume (3). Number (2)/2017

https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/aaup/vol3/iss2/2

22

Mousa: Geometric approaches and bifurcations in the Dichotomous decision

Geometric approaches and…

Abdelrahim M. and Alberto P.

Theorem 4.1. Consider the case where (𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) is (+, +) . Then there is a mixed strategy
(𝑙1 + 𝑝, 𝑙2 + 𝑞) with
𝑝=

𝑞1
√|𝐴21

|2

+ |𝐴11 |2

and
𝑞=

𝑞2
√|𝐴12

|2

+ |𝐴22 |2

for every 1 < 𝑙1 < 𝑛1 − 1 and 1 < 𝑙2 < 𝑛2 − 1, where 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 are nonnegative real
values.
Proof. Note that if the mixed strategies (𝑙1 ± 𝑝, 𝑙2 ± 𝑞) are located along the horizontal and
vertical axes (see the black rectangles in Figure 16), then they become pure and given by
(𝑙1 ±

𝐴21
|𝐴21 |

, 𝑙2 ±

𝐴12
|𝐴12 |

).

Considering the case where (𝐸12 , 𝐸21 ) is (+, +). Thus, p and q may have now real values
instated of being natural and their values are derived by applying the Pythagorean Theorem
among the three sides of right triangles given in Figure 16, which ends the proof.
■
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Figure 15. (𝒍𝟏 + 𝒑, 𝒍𝟐 + 𝒒) is the mixed strategy when (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) 𝐢𝐬 (+, +).

Bifurcations between pure strategies
In this section, we study geometrically the bifurcations between the pure strategies and see the
signs effect of the coordinates of the influence matrix. In Figures 17, 19, 20 and 18, we show
all possible bifurcations between the pure strategies that may occur in the corresponding
Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15, respectively.
In Figure 17, we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (+, +).
The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the
horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 12, respectively. The red rectangles represent
the red rectangles in Figure 12 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that
there are three red overlaps between, where the mixed strategies may occur.

33|

Journal of the Arab American University. Volume (3). Number (2)/2017

https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/aaup/vol3/iss2/2

24

Mousa: Geometric approaches and bifurcations in the Dichotomous decision

Geometric approaches and…

Abdelrahim M. and Alberto P.

Figure 16. The bifurcations between the pure strategies when(𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (+, +).

In Figure 18, we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when(𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (−, −).
The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the
horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 15, respectively. The red rectangles represent
the blue rectangles in Figure 15 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that
there are three red overlaps between, where the mixed strategies may occur.

Figure 17. The bifurcations between the pure strategies when(𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (−, −).
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In Figure 19, we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) =
(+, −)). The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies)
on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 15, respectively. The red rectangles
represent the orange rectangles in Figure 13 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We
observe that there are no overlaps between.

Figure 18. The bifurcations between the pure strategies when(𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (+, −).

In Figure 20, we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when (𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (−, +).
The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the
horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 14, respectively. The red rectangles represent
the green rectangles in Figure 14 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that
there are no overlaps between.
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Figure 19. The bifurcations between the pure strategies when(𝑬𝟏𝟐 , 𝑬𝟐𝟏 ) = (−, +).

Conclusions
Resorting to the Dichotomous decision model presented in (Mousa et al., 2014a), two geometric
approaches have been studied to construct all possible decisions tilings in which pure and mixed
Nash equilibria co-exist and change with the relative decision preferences of the individuals.
We have characterized all possible Nash domains for pure and mixed strategies and discussed
the dependence of Nash equilibria on the parameters of the model. We have seen how the
coordinates of the influence matrix and the total number of individuals can alter the order of
the horizontal and vertical thresholds which allow the occurrence of bifurcations with and
without overlaps between the pure strategies.
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الملخص
بالرجوع إلى نموذج القرار ذي الحدين الذي ي مكن مجموعة من األفراد اتخاذ ق اررات بديلة ،تم دراسة نهجين هندسيين لبناء جميع الق اررات المفضلة و
الممكن اتخاذها .لقد تم دراسة الطريقة التي يتواجد فيها التوازن األفضل و كيف يتغير هذا التوازن بتغيير التفضيالت عند األفراد .وتم إيجاد كل
مجاالت ناش االستراتيجية (النقية منها والمختلطة) وتم تحديد مجال كل المتغيرات الذي يضمن مثل هذه التوازنات النقية أن تكون إما استراتيجيات
ناش متماسكة أو متباينة .لقد تم توضيح أثر كل من مصفوفة اإلحداثيات و العدد الكلي لألفراد على وقوع التداخالت المتعددة بين اإلستراتيجيات
النقية.

91A43, 91A35, 91A25, 91A05 :MSC2000
الكلمات الدالة :نموذج القرار ذي الحدين ،توازنات ناش النقية ،توازنات ناش المختلطة ،التداخالت.
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